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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICK L STONEHOCKER, 
Petitioner & Appellant, 
vs. 
JACQUELINE F. M. STONEHOCKER, 
Respondent & Appellee. 
Appellate Court No. 20060292 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (as amended, 1996.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. In awarding attorney fees in the sum of $25,000 in favor of the 
Appellee, the trial court as a matter of law erred in its failure to enter 
any findings supporting the award. 
II. In awarding the Appellee specific property: 
A. The trial court erred factually in awarding $46,000 to the 
Appellant as premarital property and then offsetting that 
award against the line of credit on the family home in the sum 
of $44,990 based upon no findings. 
B. The trial court erred in failing to address the issue of equity in 
the West Haven, Utah home. 
C. The trial court erred in to the Appellee the 1998 Volkswagen 
Passat even though it was property of Stoney Motors, which 
was awarded exclusively to the Appellant. 
D. The trial court failed to address the issue of rent received by 
the Appellee during the course of the separation. 
E. The trial court should have set a specific date to terminate 
the Appellant's obligation to pay the first mortgage and line 
of credit on the parties' residence following the issuance of the 
Memorandum Decision dated July 5, 2006. 
III. Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that the findings issued by this court 
in support of these orders are insufficient as a matter of law for the 
Appellant to have a meaningful review before this court. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (as amended), §30-3-5(1)(as 
amended) and 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The cited portions of 
2 
those statutes and rules are set forth in verbatim in Tab 5 of the Addendum 
to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal originates from a divorce action filed in the Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County by the Appellant. This case was 
tried to the trial court on April 4, 7, 8; May 19, 20, 27; June 14, 17; and a 
hearing on a Motion to Review and Clarify on September 21, 2005 before 
the Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Court Judge. The issue of property 
distribution, debt allocation and attorney's fees were decided by a 
Memorandum Decision signed by the Honorable Ernie W. Jones on the 5th 
day of July 2005. Subsequently, based upon a Motion to Review and 
Clarify filed by Appellant's trial attorney, Phil Patterson, a request was 
made for the trial court to review and reconsider parts of its Memorandum 
Decision. At the time of the Oral Argument on the Appellant's Motion 
held on September 21, 2005, the trial court ruled that if the line of credit is 
a debt of Stoney Motors then the Appellant should pay it, but entered no 
findings as to whether it was a debt of Stoney Motors. No evidence was 
taken, presented or given. This offset was subsequently included in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in the Decree of Divorce, 
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which was signed by the trial court on December 28, 2005. The trial court 
also ruled in its Memorandum Decision of July 5, 2005 that the Appellee 
was awarded attorney's fees in the sum of $25,000; and was awarded the 
1998 Volkswagen Passat which was bought, purchased and owned by 
Stoney Motors, LLC. The Appellee was also awarded the parties' 
residence located in West Haven, Utah; the equity in the home was not 
addressed in the trial court's findings; and the trial Court failed to address 
credits the Appellant was to receive based upon a Recommendation 
and Order on Order to Show Cause held on April 29, 2004 before 
Commissioner Douglas B. Thomas. The trial court failed to enter findings of 
fact addressing the Appellant's request for credit and a determination of 
the amount Appellant should receive, if any, from the rent the Appellee 
had received from March 1, 2004 to May 27, 2005 in the sum of $500 per 
month. This appeal originates from those provisions within the Decree of 
Divorce that awarded the Appellee $25,000 in attorney's fees and the 
family residence, but did not address the Appellant's entitlement to an 
equity interest; and determined at the September 21, 2005 hearing that 
the Appellant's premarital equity lien of $46,000 should offset the line of 
credit on the premises in the sum of approximately $44,990 even though 
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the line of credit was secured by the family residence, no evidence 
justifying the offset was offered by the Appellee. In reality, the Appellant 
lost the $46,000 premarital equity lien plus $44,990, which the Appellee 
was ordered to pay. The Appellee was also awarded the 1998 
Volkswagen Passat that was owned by Stoney Motors, LLC even though 
the Appellant was specifically awarded, by the trial court, all assets of 
Stoney Motors, LLC. No findings were entered by the trial court ordering 
any credit in favor of the Appellant from a renter that the Appellee had in 
the marital home since March 1, 2004 through May 27, 2005, and the trial 
court failed to set a date terminating the Appellant's obligation to pay 
the first mortgage and line of credit on the parties' residence following the 
issuance of the Memorandum Decision dated July 5, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on April 25, 1998 and maintained a 
marriage relationship for approximately seven years (F. of Fct. H2). 
2. The parties had separated and reconciled several times; April 2001, 
October 2002, and June 2003 (F. of Fct. H3). 
3. A divorce petition was filed on September 30, 2003 (F. of Fct. 114). 
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Appellant filed an Order to Show Cause which was held on April 29, 
2004. The Domestic Relations Commissioner determined that some 
amount of rent was to be imputed to the Appellee effective March 
1, 2004, but the trial court would determine the amount (See 
Recommendation and Order on Order to Show Cause dated May 
24,2004,112). 
Appellee testified that Ms. Nessen paid her $500 per month from 
March 1, 2004 through May 27, 2005 (Tr. 1174:8-13). 
The Appellee earned the following annual income (F. of Fct. 1161 
and Memorandum Decision 1161).: 
1999 $64,000 
2000 $ 52,000 
2001 $35,000 
2002 $ 66,000 
2003 $108,000 
2004 $132,000 
The Appellee is employed and currently earns $4,000 a month in net 
income (F. of Fct. H60 and Memorandum Decision 1160). 
The Appellee's monthly expenses were $7,125 (F. of Fct. 1162 and 
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Memorandum Decision 1162). 
9. The Appellant is the owner of Stoney Motors, LLC, which is a used car 
dealership, and earns $10,000 per month (F. of Fct. H63). 
10. The Appellant had the following annual income (F. of Fct. 1164 and 
Memorandum Decision 1164): 
2000 $ 75,000 
2001 $81,000 
2002 $154,000 
2003 $ 80,000 
2004 $ 72,000 
11. The Appellant had monthly expenses of $7,311.53 (F. of Fct. 1165 and 
Memorandum Decision 1165). 
12. The Appellee asked for $3,585 in alimony, but based upon her ability 
to earn income, the Appellee's request for alimony was denied (F. of 
Fct. U66 and H70, and Memorandum Decision H66). 
13. The Appellant owns a used car dealership called "Stoney Motors, 
LLC" and its assets. The business was established in 2001 (F. of Fct. 117 
and U8). 
14. The Appellee is listed on the LLC as a 50% owner of Stoney Motors, 
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LLC, though she was not involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the business, and only did some billing and paperwork for the 
dealership several years prior to the trial (F. of Fct. HI0, HI 1 and 1112). 
15. The dealership had been valued by Appellee's accountant, Charles 
Ulrich, at $200,000 based upon his testimony, and Altina Stott, 
accountant for the Appellant, valued the business at $100,000 
based upon telephone communication that occurred between 
Altina Stott and Charles Ulrich though Ms. Stott testified at trial that 
she believed no value existed (F. of Fct. 1)14 and 1115). 
16. The trial court valued the business on the basis that there was no 
good will in that the good will is solely attributable to Appellant's 
reputation for competency (F. of Fct. Ill9 and Memorandum 
Decision 1J20). 
17. Even though the Appellee had only token involvement in the 
business for a limited time, she received K-1 tax forms, which showed 
that the Appellee received ordinary income from the business. 
Though Appellee testified that she never received any income from 
the business, evidence presented by Appellant at trial showed she 
had received income (F. of Fct. 1121 and 1122). 
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18. The trial court found that professional reputation such as the 
Appellant's could be valued, but unless the professional retires and 
the business is sold, his reputation should not be treated any 
differently from a professional or advanced degree (F. of Fct. U20 
and Memorandum Decision 1120). 
19. Stoney Motors, in reality, is a sole proprietorship of Rick Stonehocker 
(F. of Fct. 1121 and Memorandum Decision U23). 
20. On November 27, 2000, a line of credit was acquired against the 
home in the sum of $45,000, which was transferred into Stoney 
Motors' business account during May 2001, which is an indebtedness 
of Stoney Motors, LLC (F. of Fct. 1125). 
21. The Appellant is responsible to pay all state and federal taxes on 
income that was sent to the Appellee on K-l forms for the years 
2002, 2003 and 2004 in connection with Stoney Motors, LLC. The 
Appellant is also responsible for all state and federal income taxes 
for Stoney Motors, LLC (F. of Fct. 1J26 and 1127 and Memorandum 
Decision H25 and 1126). 
22. The parties built a home in West Haven, Utah in 2001 with the home 
costing between $320,000 to $360,000, and was appraised, for the 
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purposes of the trial at $455,000 (F. of Fct. 1131, U32 and 1133 and 
Memorandum Decision 1130,1131 and 1132). 
23. At the time of the divorce, there was a first mortgage balance in the 
name of the Appellant of $328,765, and an equity line balance of 
$44,990, which was also in Appellant's name (F. of Fct. U34 and H35 
and Memorandum Decision 1133 and U34). 
24. There existed $81,344 of equity by subtracting the two mortgages 
from the appraised value of $455,000 (See F. of Fct. 1120 and H21). 
25. The Appellant, on January 8, 1999, issued a personal check to help 
pay for the home, and obtained a $30,000 line of credit by pledging 
his Roy, Utah home, which was acquired prior to the marriage, for a 
total cash advance for the home purchase of $46,000 (F. of Fct. H36 
and U28 and Memorandum Decision 1135). 
26. The payment of the $46,000 by the Appellant for the purchase of the 
home came from premarital assets (F. of Fct. H39 and Memorandum 
Decision U38). 
27. Both the Appellant and the Appellee requested the West Haven, 
Utah home, but the home was awarded to the Appellee, subject to 
Appellant's $46,000 marital lien owed to the Appellant for his 
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premarital investment. The lien was to be paid to the Appellant by 
the Appellee from the equity in the home (F. of Fct. 1136 and 1138 and 
Memorandum Decision 1138 and H42). 
28. The Appellee was to pay the first mortgage and the line of credit 
(Memorandum Decision H41). The line of credit, which is secured by 
the home was ordered to be paid by Stoney Motors as a debt of 
Stoney Motors with the Appellant being awarded Stoney Motors (F. 
of Fct. H42 and 1124). 
29. The Appellee was ordered to pay both the first mortgage and home 
equity loan subject to the Appellant's equity lien of $46,000 
(Memorandum Decision 1141 and H42). 
30. The Appellee owed an obligation to her father, Carl Manzel, of 
$52,000 and to her boyfriend, Todd Walker the sum of $26,000, which 
the Appellee was ordered to pay (F. of Fct. 1177 and H78 and 
Memorandum Decision 1177 and 1178). 
31. The Appellant incurred attorney's fees, accountant's fees, witness 
fees and subpoena costs of $33,279.27, and the Appellee incurred 
attorney's fees and costs of $35,979 (F. of Fct. HI07 and 
Memorandum Decision HI05 and HI07). 
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32. The Appellee requested the trial court award her attorney's fees and 
costs, and the Appellant was ordered to pay $25,000 of the 
Appellee's attorney's fees, court costs and accountant's fees (F. of 
Fct. V05, V07, HI08 and HI 11). 
33. The trial court awarded attorney's fees based upon the Appellant's 
position in trial when he testified, when asked a question during trial, 
that the Appellee should not receive any property. The trial court 
found the Appellant was unreasonable, untenable and totally 
unrealistic (F. of Fct. H109, H110 and H111). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE ATTORNEY'S FEES OF $25,000, THE 
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER ANY FINDINGS JUSTIFYING THE 
AWARD AS IS REQUIRED BY §30-3-3, AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 
AWARD SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The trial court awarded the Appellee $25,000 to be applied to her 
attorney's fees, court costs and accountant's fees. The trial court, in 
making this award, did not enter any findings establishing the need of the 
Appellee, the ability of the Appellant to assist the Appellee, and the 
reasonableness of the fees as required by §30-3-3. Further, the attorney 
for the Appellee did not testify under oath; no stipulation was put on the 
record by the attorney for the Appellee; and no affidavit under oath was 
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submitted by the attorney for the Appellee regarding attorney's fees and 
costs, and the three elements referred to above. 
II. IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE SPECIFIC PROPERTY: 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FACTUALLY IN AWARDING $46,000 TO 
THE APPELLANT AS PREMARITAL PROPERTY AND THEN SIMPLY 
OFFSETTING THAT AWARD AGAINST THE LINE OF CREDIT ON THE 
FAMILY HOME IN THE SUM OF $44,990 BASED UPON NO 
FINDINGS. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
EQUITY IN THE WEST HAVEN, UTAH HOME. 
C. AWARDING THE 1998 VOLKSWAGEN PASSAT TO THE APPELLEE 
EVEN THOUGH IT WAS PROPERTY OF STONEY MOTORS, WHICH 
WAS AWARDED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE APPELLANT; 
D. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF RENT 
RECEIVED BY THE APPELLEE DURING THE COURSE OF THE 
SEPARATION. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SET A TERMINATION DATE 
REGARDING THE APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE FIRST 
MORTGAGE AND LINE OF CREDIT FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF JULY 5, 2005. 
Rule 52(a) and U.C.A §30-3-5(1) requires the trial court enter findings 
on all issues that materially affect the award of property. The award of the 
specific items of property was not supported by the findings prepared by 
the court either directly from the Memorandum Decisions or any verbal 
findings entered onto the record by the court. In fact, the trial court did 
not make any findings, but rather just simply made an award without any 
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reasons. Further, a modification was made by the trial court of its July 5, 
2005 Memorandum Decision at the September 21, 2005 hearing without 
evidence being presented. 
III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW A MEANINGFUL 
APPEAL 
It is clear from the record that the Findings of Fact are insufficient to 
support the trial court's award as argued. Rule 52(a) requires specific 
findings. The burden is in the Appellant to marshall the evidence to show 
the trial court's findings are in error. Still, there must be sufficient findings 
entered by the trial court. The case of Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d. 423, 426 
(Utah 1986), a custody case still requires that the court's findings must be 
sufficient to afford an Appellant a meaningful appeal. While it is true, the 
trial court may look at oral findings. Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d. 1055, 
1056(Utah Ct. App. 1987). This trial court made no findings on the record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE ATTORNEY'S FEES OF $25,000, THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILED TO ENTER ANY FINDINGS JUSTIFYING THE AWARD AS IS REQUIRED BY 
§30-3-3, AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
In awarding the Appellee her attorney's fees, the trial court made 
an error of law in not making specific findings. The Appellant challenges 
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the award of $25,000 in attorney's fees to be given to the Appellee by the 
trial court. It is clear from the trial court's findings, that the only reason the 
award was made is because the trial court perceived the Appellant to be 
intransigent in requesting that the Appellee receive none of the property 
(i.e., selfish). However, all divorce actions are selfish in nature (F. of Fct. 
11109 and HI 10 and Memorandum Decision HI09 and HI 10). Section 30-3-3 
of the Utah Code Annotated (2004) requires the trial court to address 
specifically: 1) the financial need of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of 
the other spouse to pay; 3) the reasonableness of the fees, before 
attorney's fees may be awarded. The trial court did not address any of 
those requirements. 
It is well established that the decision to award costs and attorney 
fees in divorce proceedings lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court (Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989 & supp. 1994); Munns v. Munns, 790 
P. 2d. 116, 123 (Utah App.1990)). The trial court may only award attorney 
fees if the attorney fees are supported by the evidence that the fees are 
reasonable and in an amount reasonably needed by the party requesting 
the award, not for being selfish. Huckv. Huck, 734 P.2d. 417, 419 (UCA 
1986). In the case of Potter v. Potter. 845 P.2d. 272; 204 Utah Adv.Rep. 37 
15 
(1993), which applied the dicta of Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d. 489, 493 (Utah 
App. 1991) held that an attorney fees' award "must be based on 
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the abiiity of the 
other spouse to pay, and the reasonabieness of the requested fees." To 
permit review of the trial court's ruling on attorney fees, appellate courts 
have insisted on adequate findings to explain the award. Id. at 494. 
The trial court in Potter, supra, awarded $1,000 in attorney fees 
without an explanation as to how the trial court arrived at that amount. 
The distinction between the Potter case and this case is that no testimony 
was ever presented by the Appellee in the case at hand by affidavit, 
under oath or even by stipulation addressing the three elements. In Potter, 
supra, testimony was presented as to need and reasonableness, but no 
findings were entered. Rule 52(a) does not allow for waiver of the required 
findings being entered by the trial court to justify an attorney fee award. 
In the case of Talley v. Talley, 739 P. 2d. 83; 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 
(1987), the appellate court dealt with the issue of attorney fees. The 
appellate court held that the Appellee had the burden of establishing 
reasonableness. In the Talley case, supra., no finding of reasonableness 
was ever made. Attorney fees were denied due to the failure of the 
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Plaintiff to establish reasonableness. Beals v. Beals, 682 P. 2d. 862 (Utah 
1984); Delatore v. Delatore. 680 P. 2d. 27 (Utah 1989). 
In Keroketh v. Keroketh. 610 P. 2d. 1380, 1384-1385 (Utah 1980), 
counsel for the Plaintiff proffered testimony and produced an exhibit 
itemizing the time and costs expended by him, his associates, his clerk and 
the hourly rates charged for each. Conspicuously absent was any 
evidence regarding the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the 
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case, 
the result accomplished and the rates commonly charged for divorce 
actions in the community. The proffer of testimony is not sufficient to meet 
both case law and statutory requirements. 
This is the exact fact pattern in this case. A proffer was made by 
counsel for Appellee; an exhibit showing hours and costs was also 
submitted (Tr. 1279:5-1280:24; Exhibit 15). Even though counsel for the 
Appellant did not ask questions regarding attorney fees and costs (Tr. 
1280:7-20), that failure is not sufficient to justify in awarding attorney fees 
and costs, and ignore the requirements of Rule 52(a) Talley, supra 84; Kerr 
v. Kerr. 610 P. 2d. 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). 
The case of Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 41; 974 P. 2d. 306, 363 ; 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1999), held that an award of attorney fees must be 
based upon sufficient findings addressing the financial need of recipient 
spouse; the ability of the other spouse to pay; and the reasonableness of 
the fees. Schaumberg v. Schaumberq, 875 P. 2d. 598; 604 )Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Bell v. Bell. 810 P. 2d. 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In citing the 
case of Endrodv v. Endrodv. 914 P. 2d. 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The Rehn decision holds that the findings of fact in awarding attorney fees 
is a question of law which the appellate court will review for correctness. 
Clearly in this case, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to 
enter findings addressing the elements required by the various appellate 
courts and U.C.A. §30-3-3 (1994 and 2004, as amended) cited by the 
Appellant specifically: 
1) The financial need of the recipient spouse; 
2) The ability of the other spouse to pay; and 
3) The reasonableness of fees. 
The Appellee's annual income found by the trial court was as follows 
(F. of Fct.H61): 
1999: $64,000 
2000: $ 52,000 
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2001: $35,000 
2002: $ 66,000 
2003: $108,000 
2004: $132,000 
The Appellant's annual income was found to be as follows (F. of Fct. 
1164): 
2000: $ 75,000 
2001: $81,000 
2002: $154,000 
2003: $ 80,000 
2004: $ 72,000 
It is also interesting to note the trial court also found that the 
Appellee is employed and currently earns $4,000 a month net income (F. 
of Fct. H60), and the Appellant earns about $10,000 per month (F. of Fct. 
1163). However, in 2004, the trial court found the Appellee earned $132,000 
(See F. of Fct. 1161) and the Appellant earned $72,000 (See F. of Fct. H64). 
The Appellee testified that it is necessary to have an attorney to 
represent her in the divorce action and agreed to pay an hourly fee of 
$200 plus a retainer to represent her, plus $62.50 for staff time (Tr. 1035:6-
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22). However, no evidence was ever presented regarding the Appellee's 
need for financial help to pay her attorney's fees or costs. 
Appellee's counsel addresses the request for attorney fees during 
closing argument, but that is noi direct evidence (Tr. 1468:13-8). The issue 
of the Appellant's ability to pay was brought up during the closing 
argument, not during the trial (Tr. 1469:14-18). The reference was only that 
the Appellant had the ability to pay. 
The inadequacies of the trial court's findings of fact regarding 
attorney fees cannot be cured by simply resorting to the trial record. No 
evidence was presented as to need of the Appellee; the ability of the 
Appellant to assist the Appellee with her attorney fees; and the 
reasonableness of the fees. The trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding attorney fees. The award of attorney fees by the trial court must 
be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
II. 
IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE SPECIFIC PROPERTY, 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FACTUALLY IN AWARDING $46,000 TO 
THE APPELLANT AS PREMARITAL PROPERTY AND THEN SIMPLY 
OFFSETTING THAT AWARD AGAINST THE LINE OF CREDIT ON THE 
FAMILY HOME IN THE SUM OF $44,990 BASED UPON NO 
FINDINGS. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
EQUITY IN THE WEST HAVEN, UTAH HOME. 
C. AWARDING THE 1998 VOLKSWAGEN PASSAT TO THE APPELLEE 
EVEN THOUGH IT WAS PROPERTY OF STONEY MOTORS, WHICH 
WAS AWARDED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE APPELLANT; 
D. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF RENT 
RECEIVED BY THE APPELLEE DURING THE COURSE OF THE 
SEPARATION. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SET A TERMINATION DATE 
REGARDING THE APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE FIRST 
MORTGAGE AND LINE OF CREDIT FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION OF JULY 5, 2005. 
The Appellant challenges sufficiency of the trial court's findings in 
awarding the Appellee specific awards of property that were not 
supported by sufficient findings in order for the Appellee to be awarded 
the following: 
A. An offset of the Appellant's $46,000 premarital assets put into 
the home which were offset in the Findings of Fact entered by 
the trial court as a result of the Oral Argument on September 
21, 2005 against the line of credit on the home that conflicts 
with the trial court's Memorandum Decision issued on July 5, 
2005. 
B. The awarding to the Appellee the family residence, but failed 
to divide the equity between the Appellant and the Appellee. 
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C. The awarding the Appellee the 1998 Volkswagen Passat 
automobile owned by Stoney Motors, LLC, when the Appellant 
was awarded the assets of Stoney Motors, LLC. 
D. The failure of the trial court to address U2 of the 
Recommendation and Order on Order to Show Cause dated 
May 24, 2004 deprived the Appellant of a financial entitlement 
and/or credit from the rental income that the Appellee 
received in the sum of $500 per month from March 1, 2004 
through trial, specifically, May 27, 2005. 
E. The failure to set a date for the Appellant to terminate the 
monthly payments on the first mortgage and line of credit 
when the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision of July 5, 
2005, ordered the Appellant to make payments 
The Appellant challenges the trial court's findings on the grounds 
and for the reasons that the trial court has failed to make sufficient 
findings, or more specifically, any findings to support its Conclusions of Law 
in the awarding of property referred to above. The standard of review is 
very explicit in these cases. According to the Court of Appeals of Utah, 
"Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in adjusting the financial 
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interest of parties to divorce and modification proceedings so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P. 2d. 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d. 
1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The Court of Appeals of Utah further 
asserted that because trial courts possess such broad discretion, that the 
court presumes a correctness, "absent" manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Id. Cumminas v. Cumminas, 821 P. 
2d. 472, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 'The trial court's determination will not 
be upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary of (this court) determines that the court abused its discretion." 
Cumminas v. Cumminas, 821 P. 2d. 472, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1991): Durfee v. 
Durfee. 796 P. 2d. 713, 717 (Utah Ct. App.1990). 
In order to meet this standard and demonstrate that the findings 
were either sufficiently lacking or were clearly erroneous, the burden is on 
the Appellant to "marshall all evidence that supports the finding and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the finding is so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of that evidence." Crockett v. Crockett, 
836 P. 2d. at 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P. 2d. 836, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Clearly, based upon the cases cited, the burden is 
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on the Appellant. However, the Appellate Court also cites Rule 52(a) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the trial court to make 
specific findings to justify the trial court's award. Utah Code Annotated 
§30-3-5(1) supp. 2000 (emphasis added) requires that when a decree of 
divorce is rendered, "trial court may include orders as relating to . . . 
property, debts or obligations." Rule 52(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that in all actions tried upon facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon and judgment should be entered pursuant 
to Rule 58A. The Appellant relies upon the case of Humont v. Humont, 793 
P. 2d. 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) "citation admitted" which holds that 
the major purpose of a property division is to achieve a fair, just and 
equitable result between the parties. "As a general rule, equity requires 
that each party retain their separate property that he or she brought into 
the marriage." The trial court's property and debt allocations must be 
based on adequate findings. See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); 
Humont v. Humont, 793 P. 2d. at 425. This trial record is completely devoid 
of sufficient findings made on the record by this court to support its 
conclusions of law. In fact, no findings were made by the trial court in 
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most instances. The trial court's failure to enter specific, detailed findings 
supporting its financial determinations. Hall v. Hall. 858 P. 2d. 1018, 1021 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) constitutes an abuse of discretion that amounts to 
"reversible error unless the facts on the record are clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of a judgment." 
Humont v. Humont, 793 P. 2d. at 425. The Court of Appeals also has taken 
the position that, while considerable difference to the factual findings of 
the trial court are given, the Court of Appeals will examine the conclusions 
of law arising from the findings under a correction-of-error standard 
according no particular deference to the trial court. Scadden v. Bobo, 
803 P. 2d. 1268, 1271-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1990, citations admitted). The trial 
court made no oral findings on the record, but simply took the case under 
advisement (See Tr. 1494:9-11). 
As it pertains to specific objections of the Appellant, an individual 
analysis of the factual basis or lack thereof will be directed as outlined in 
the statement contained herein. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FACTUALLY IN AWARDING $46,000 TO 
THE APPELLANT AS PREMARITAL PROPERTY AND THEN SIMPLY 
OFFSETTING THAT AWARD AGAINST THE LINE OF CREDIT ON THE 
FAMILY HOME IN THE SUM OF $44,990 BASED UPON NO 
25 
FINDINGS. 
The trial court undertook this process at a September 21, 2005 
hearing, which was predicated upon a Motion to Reconsider and Clarify 
filed by the Appellant. No similar motion was filed by the Appellee. No 
testimony was taken, but rather oral argument was made by the 
respective counsel for both the Appellant and Appellee concerning the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision dated July 5, 2005. The trial court in its 
initial Memorandum Decision dated July 5, 2005 found in Finding #35 that 
the Appellant paid for the lot based upon a $16,000 personal check 
dated January 8, 1999 (See Plaintiff's Exhibit #20) and a $30,000 line of 
credit obtained on his Roy, Utah home that was a premarital asset for a 
total of $46,000. (See Memorandum Decision, H27). The trial court, under 
1138 of the Memorandum Decision, found that the $46,000 was a 
premarital asset and that the Appellant had a lien on the West Haven, 
Utah home for $46,000 (See Memorandum Decision, 1142; F. of Fct. 1136, H37, 
1138 and H30). However, based upon oral argument occurring on 
September 21, 2005, the trial court modified its decision in the 
Memorandum in 1142 of the Findings of Fact has been amended to 
include the offset of the $46,000 premarital award made by the trial court 
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in favor of the Appellant, and an offset of $44,990 for the line of credit on 
the family residence, which the Appellee was ordered to pay. No findings 
have been entered on the record that would justify this type of 
modification or the award which is inconsistent with the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision of July 5,2005. The Memorandum Decision 
required the Appellee to pay both the first mortgage and the home 
equity loan (See Memorandum Decision, 1141). Since the trial court made 
no findings as to why a change should occur, and a conflict between its 
Memorandum Decision of July 5, 2005 and the hearing of September 21, 
2005, the apparent change fails to meet the requirements of having 
sufficient findings to support offsetting the Appellant's equity lien of 
$46,000 as is required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) (U.C.A. 2000, as amended). 
Pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, upon a 
motion made not any later than 10 days after entry of the judgment, the 
court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a 
new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Clearly in this case, the Memorandum 
Decision was dated July 5, 2005, and the hearing which this change 
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approved regarding offsetting the line of credit of $44,990 with the 
Appellant's premarital equity lien of $46,000 occurred on September 21, 
2005 based upon no testimony and a simple statement by the trial court 
that, if the debt is Mr Stonehocker's, he should pay it. (September 21, 2005, 
Tr. 25:17-18). However, the trial court ordered the Appellee to pay both 
the first mortgage and line of credit (September 21, 2005, Tr. 23:13-24; 
12:18; 14:8). The same evidence was presented during the course of the 
trial and the court made its decision based upon its Memorandum 
Decision dated July 5, 2005. In determining the equitable division of 
assets, the court failed to assign a value to the assets that would justify the 
type of offset the court subsequently made with regards to the premarital 
debt and line of credit awarded in its Memorandum Decision. The trial 
court, based upon the analysis in Talley v. Tallev, 739 P. 2d. 83(Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (1987), should have entered specific 
findings. The award of debt should be reversed on the basis there were no 
findings that would justify this type of offset not to mention any evidence 
being discussed. This court has also been very specific that the findings 
entered by the trial court must be sufficient in order to allow a meaningful 
appeal when there is, in fact, no ability to ascertain the basis of the 
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findings and meaningful appeal is impossible. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d. 
423, 426 (Utah 1986). In the September 21, 2005 hearing, Mr. Patterson on 
behalf of the Appellant, and Mr. Echard on behalf of the Appellee 
proffered facts that at the time of trial was not testified to or discussed 
such as the 2004 tax returns. Even the trial court is not able to relate back 
to the factual testimony at trial by ordering that the Appellee be 
responsible for both mortgages (Tr. 10:22; 11-10). Mr. Echard argues that, 
based upon the 2004 tax return for Stoney Motors, LLC, that the Appellant 
should be awarded the line of credit debt (See September 21, 2005, Tr. 
11:11 -12:4). However, the trial court states "that if there is a debt in 
connection with the business which I have given to him, he's responsible 
for It" (September 21, 2005, Tr. 28:17-19). What does this mean? Itis 
impossible to tell as no findings were made by the trial court as to whether 
or not the line of credit was really an obligation of Stoney Motors, which 
the Appellant was ordered to pay or not. The offset should be reversed 
and Appellant's equity lien stands and the Appellee's obligation to pay 
the line of credit upheld. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
EQUITY IN THE WEST HAVEN, UTAH HOME. 
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During the trial, both parties had requested that the West Haven 
home be awarded to them. However, the trial court awarded the marital 
home to the Appellee (F. of Fct. 1J41). What the trial court did not do is 
address the issue of equity and how equity should be divided between 
the parties. Both the first mortgage with Zions Bank and the line of credit 
with Zions Bank were obtained in the name of the Appellant. However, 
there is no dispute that the title to the home was transferred to the 
Appellant and the Appellee's name, jointly. Appellee's father assisted the 
parties as the general contractor. The only testimony, however, that dealt 
with equity submitted by the Appellee was that fact that the Appellee 
should receive the equity because of her father's assistance on the home 
(See Tr. 69:10-18). However, no findings were ever entered by the trial 
court as to the validity of the claimed gift, nor as to whether or not the 
equity in the home in West Haven should be offset against other marital 
assets. The record is completely devoid of any findings either made by 
the trial court's Memorandum Decision of July 5, 2005 or oral findings on 
the record. The West Haven Home appraised for $455,000 (See F. of Fct. 
1133). A first mortgage in favor of Zions Bank existed as a lien against the 
property in the sum of $328,765 (F. of Fct. U34). In addition, there was a 
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home equity line balance of $44,990 (F. of Fct. 1135). By combining the 
balances of both the first mortgage and the line of credit together, there 
exists a total of $372,155 due to Zions Bank. Obviously, the Appellant's 
position is that in subtracting the mortgages from the appraised value, 
there exists equity of $81,345. The trial court did award an equity lien in 
the sum of $46,000 against the home in favor of the Appellant, which 
would reduce the net equity down to $35,345. The trial court made no 
finding on the record or in its Memorandum Decision of any costs 
associated with any sale or any reduction or any offsets against the home 
that would deny the Appellant an award of equity. However, based upon 
the trial court's September 21, 2005 statement that if the debt is Mr. 
Stonehocker's, he should pay it and specifically, Finding of Fact H42, the 
outstanding obligation on the home has been subsequently reduced by 
removing the line of credit of $44,990 creating additional equity in the 
home back to the $81,345 figure. The failure of the trial court to 
specifically enter findings articulating financial offsets or values has 
created a legal nightmare by making it difficult to have any type of 
meaningful appeal to argue that the trial court erred in its findings. As 
previously stated, the burden on the Appellant in the case before this 
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Court is extremely high as the Court accepts that the trial courts may 
exercise broad discretion in adjusting the financial interests of the party to 
divorce modification proceeding so long as its decision is within the 
confines of legal precedent. Crockett v. Crockett at 818, Further as 
articulated in Cumminas at 479, by the Court of Appeals, the trial court's 
determination will not be upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary. Cumminas, supra, 479. However, you 
must have findings in order to build the appeal. This entire record is 
devoid of findings that justify the Conclusions of Law entered by the trial 
court. From the record it is clear that the record is completely devoid of 
any findings made by this trial court on the record and so is the 
Memorandum Decision. 
The Appellant requests that the issue of equity in the marital home 
be remanded to the trial court for appropriate findings to address the 
issue of equity. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO THE APPELLEE THE 
1998 VOLKSWAGEN PASSAT EVEN THOUGH IT WAS PROPERTY OF 
STONEY MOTORS, WHICH WAS AWARDED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE 
APPELLANT. 
The trial court awarded the 1998 Volkswagen Passat to the Appellee 
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(F. of Fct. H99). The awarding of the Volkswagen Passat is in conflict with 
the trial court's further Finding of Fact 1124 in which the Appellee is not 
entitled to receive any portion of Stoney Motors as a marital asset. The 
Appellant was awarded, as his sole property, Stoney Motors (F. of Fct. 1123). 
The trial court also requires that the Appellant pay all state and federal 
taxes for Stoney Motors and hold the Appellee harmless for the tax years 
2002, 2003 and 2004. Again, in order to overcome the trial court's findings, 
evidence must be marshalled that support this contention. However, the 
trial court's own findings are in conflict with each other. The Appellant 
testified that the 1998 Volkswagen Passat was paid for out of business 
funds of Stoney Motors (Tr. 618:4). The Appellee also identified Check 
#3555 from Stoney Motors to Ensign Imports that the Appellant used to 
pay for the Passat, which certainly vests ownership in Stoney Motors(Tr. 
727:14-21). 
The Appellee's only reference to the Passat was a VW and says it 
was the car she was driving when, "The Appellant beat her up." (Tr. 
1094:14-25). The trial court makes no findings as to ownership of the 1998 
Volkswagen Passat other than awarding it to the Appellee. However, as 
previously referred to at the hearing on September 21, 2005, the trial court 
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referenced that any debt in connection with the business, the Appellant 
was responsible for (September 21, 2005, Tr 27:18-20). However, that ruling 
should work consistent with the 1998 Volkswagen Passat. If it is an asset of 
Stoney Motors, LLC, it should have been awarded to the Appellant. 
Clearly, the trial court's findings are not consistent. The trial court should 
be directed to hold further evidentiary hearings to address this matter. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF RENT 
RECEIVED BY THE APPELLEE DURING THE COURSE OF THE 
SEPARATION. 
Based upon the Recommendation and Order on Order to Show 
Cause signed on May 24, 2004, Domestic Relations Commissioner Douglas 
B. Thomas entered a finding that the Appellee's sister was living at the 
marital residence and was paying rent. The income from the rent should 
be imputed to the Appellee and be retroactive to the date of March 1, 
2004. Commissioner Thomas was unable to determine an amount, 
therefore, a specific amount to be imputed to the Appellee should be 
reserved as a trial issue. That issue was not addressed by the trial court 
during the eight (8) day trial. There is no doubt that the issue was raised in 
cross-examination by Philip Patterson, trial attorney for the Appellant. Ms. 
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Nessen had occupied the marital residence since March 1, 2004 up 
through the date of trial. (Tr. 1173:9-25). It was also admitted during cross-
examination that Ms. Nessen paid $500 per month from March 24, 2004 up 
through May 27, 2005 when cross-examination was conducted by counsel 
for the Appellant (Tr. 1174:8-13). Clearly, the trial court in its findings did 
not address that issue and should have. Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) requires the trial court to address 
those issues by making appropriate findings. It is a financial interest that 
should have been addressed, and that the Appellant has a financial issue 
in being compensated by reducing his monthly payments on the home by 
$500 a month based upon the fact that the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner requested the trial court deal with that issue in his 
Recommendation and Order on Order to Show Cause dated May 24, 
2004 making it retroactive to March 1, 2004. The Appellee admitted that 
she was receiving $500 per month during trial (Tr. 1174:8-13). The trial court 
should have awarded a credit the Appellant has an entitlement to. A fair, 
just and equitable property division did not occur. See Humont v. Humont, 
793 P. 2d. 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). This issue should be remanded 
back to the trial court to make appropriate findings. 
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E. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SET A SPECIFIC DATE TO 
TERMINATE THE APPELLANT'S OBLIGATION TO PAY THE FIRST 
MORTGAGE AND LINE OF CREDIT FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED JULY 5, 2005. 
Based upon the trial court's findings, the Appellee was ordered to 
pay both the first mortgage and line of credit with Zions Bank (F. of Fct. 1142 
and Memorandum Decision 1141). However, the matter kept dragging on 
with the Appellant being required to pay both the first mortgage and 
equity line of credit payments for seven (7) more months. Based upon an 
Order on Order to Show Cause signed by the trial court on October 6, 
2003, pursuant to H2, the Appellant was ordered to pay the first mortgage 
of $2,656.89 and the line of credit of $180 on a temporary basis. At the 
September 21, 2005 hearing, the trial court acknowledged the 
circumstance by stating in its September 21, 2005 decision, "The problem 
is, the Memorandum Decision is not a final decree." (September 21, 2005, 
Tr. 65:-8-9. That was in response to Mr. Patterson's request that the 
Appellee be responsible for the payments for the months of July, August 
and September 2005, and each month thereafter until she had 
refinanced the home in accordance with the trial court having awarded 
her the marital residence. However, this is not equitable. To require that 
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the Appellant pay seven (7) more months on a mortgage after the trial 
court entered its Memorandum Decision is inconsistent with a just and fair 
property settlement award. The fact that the Appellee was aware that 
she was to be awarded the home, but yet allow the Appellant to pay for 
seven (7) more months is inherently unfair and should be reversed. The 
trial court's original Findings of Fact as well as its Memorandum Decision 
fails to address this issue and the Appellant believes that the appropriate 
response would be for the Court of Appeals to require the trial court to 
enter a final cutoff date consistent with its Memorandum Decision, and 
that the Appellant be reimbursed for his costs and expenses. 
ARGUMENT 
III. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW 
A MEANINGFUL APPEAL. 
It is clear from the record that the Findings of Fact are insufficient to 
support the trial court's Conclusions of Law. Rule 52(a) requires specific 
findings. Those findings were not made by the trial court. It is impossible 
for the Appellant to marshall the evidence to show the trial court's findings 
are in error when no findings were made, just bare conclusions. Still, there 
must be sufficient findings entered by the trial court. The case of Smith v. 
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Smith, 726 P.2d. 423, 426 (Utah 1986), a custody case still requires that the 
court's findings must be sufficient to afford an Appellant a meaningful 
appeal. While it is true, the trial court may look at oral findings, Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 P. 2d. 1055, 1056(Utah Ct. App. 1987), this trial court made no 
findings on the record, but took the case under advisement at the 
conclusion of argument by counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the trial court to enter findings with regards to the 
attorney fees awarded in favor of the Appellee should be reversed. It is 
clear that the requirements of U.C.A. §30-3-3, and subsequent case law, 
have not been addressed or met by the trial court. No evidence was 
presented that would support such a finding. The award should be 
reversed. 
With regards to the Appellant's objection to the trial court's findings 
as to property issues, it is apparent that the trial court erred in failing to 
follow the requirements of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and U.C.A. §30-3-5(1), and cited case law. The failure of the trial court to 
articulate consistent, non-conflicting and in many instances no findings of 
fact, make a meaningful appeal impossible. Coupled with the fact that 
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the trial court enters conclusions without any findings supporting its 
rationale, either orally or on the record or in its Memorandum Decision, is 
grounds for its reversal and remand. 
As it pertains to the specific issues: 
1) The $46,000 equity lien awarded to the Appellant should be 
reinstated and not offset against the $44,990 line of credit as 
there were no findings justifying this decision. 
2) The trial court should be instructed to address the issue of 
equity in the marital home at an evidentiary hearing. 
3) The 1998 Volkswagen Passat should be awarded to the 
Appellant on the basis that it was property owned by Stoney 
Motors, which was awarded solely to the Appellant. This 
judgment should be reversed or remanded to the trial court for 
further findings. 
4) The Appellant should be granted a credit of $500 for rent paid 
to the Appellee by Ms. Nessen from March 2004 through May 
27, 2005. Said request is based upon the fact that the 
Appellant was ordered to pay the house payment and should 
be entitled that financial relief of $500 per month. No findings 
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were entered by the trial court. This issue should be remanded 
to the trial court for further findings. 
5) The trial court should have set a specific date requiring the 
Appellee to refinance the marital home cutting off the 
ongoing requirement that the Appellant be required to 
continue to pay the first mortgage and line of credit after the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision of July 5, 2005. This issue 
should be remanded to the trial court for specific findings. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Steven R. Bailey 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellan 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
RICK L. STONEHOCKER, j 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, \ 
vs. j Case No. 024902009 
JACQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER, j Ernie W. Jones 
District Judge 
Respondent. j 
This matter came on for trial on April 4, 7, and 8,2005; May 19,20, and 27, 2005, and 
June 14 and 17, 2005, before the Honorable Ernie Jones. The petitioner was present and 
represented by Attorney Phil Patterson. The respondent was present and represented by Attorney 
Robert Echard. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, and having reviewed the exhibits 
presented at trial, rules as follows: 
1. The parties were married on April 25, 1998. 
2. The parties separated and reconciled several times; in April 2001, October 2002, and 
June 2003. 
3. The divorce petition was filed September 20, 2002. 
4. The parties reside in Weber County. 
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5. No children have been born as issue of the marriage, and none are expected. 
6. There are irreconcilable differences which render the marriage impossible. 
Business Reputation and Good Will: 
7. The petitioner owns a used car dealership called "Stoney Motors." 
8. The petitioner created the dealership in 2001. 
9. The respondent claims an interest in the dealership as a marital asset. 
10. The respondent is listed on the L.L.C. as a 50-50 owner of Stoney Motors. 
11. The respondent is not involved in the day-to-day operation of the business. 
12. The respondent did do some billing and paperwork with the dealership several years 
ago. 
13. The petitioner claims the dealership has no value for good will, and therefore, the 
respondent is not entitled to any monetary compensation for the dealership. 
14. The dealership has been valued by accountant Chuck Ulrich at about $200,000. (See 
R-17,Page2). 
15. Accountant Altina Scott valued the business at about $100,000. 
16. The respondent is asking for one-half the value of the business as a marital asset. 
17. If the petitioner retired at the time of the divorce and his dealership was actually sold, 
and an amount was realized over and above the value of the tangible assets, the full amount 
should be viewed as marital property. 
18. In this case, the petitioner has not retired and no actual sale took place. Petitioner 
continues his business as of today. 
19. It would not be equitable to require petitioner to pay respondent part of the value 
Page 2 of 12 
ascribed to the good will, because the good will of a car dealer is nothing more than his 
reputation for competency. (See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P2d 774 (Utah 1992) 
20. Professional reputations can be valued, but unless the professional retires and his 
business is sold, his reputation should not be treated differently from a professional or an 
advanced degree: both simply enhance the earning ability of the holder. 
21. Although the respondent is listed as a co-owner of the business, she had only token 
involvement in the business for a limited period of time. 
22. Also, while it is true that the respondent received a K-l tax form which showed that 
respondent received ordinary income from the business, the respondent testified that she never 
actually received any income from the business. 
23. The Court finds that the business is in reality a sole proprietorship for Rick 
Stonehocker. 
24. The Court finds the respondent is not entitled to receive any portion of Stoney Motors 
as a marital asset. The Court finds that the good will of Stoney Motors is solely attributable to 
petitioner's personal, professional reputation. The respondent is awarded nothing for the good 
will of Stoney Motors. 
Income Tax Obligation: 
25. The Court finds, however, that petitioner is responsible to pay all State and Federal 
taxes that were sent to the respondent on the K-l for 2002,2003, and 2004 in connection with 
Stoney Motors. (See R-18, page 117, and R-18, page 121). 
26. Respondent is held harmless for the Federal and State income taxes incurred for 
Stoney Motors. 
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Real Property: 
Roy Home: 
27. The parties agree that the Roy home was a premarital asset which should be awarded 
to the petitioner as his sole property. Respondent has no interest in the Roy property. 
Rjyerdale Condo: 
28. The parties agree the condo is a premarital asset which should be awarded to the 
petitioner as his sole property. 
Cabo San Lucas Time Share: 
29. The time share property is awarded to the petitioner. 
West Haven Home: 
30. The parties built a home in West Haven during 2001. 
31. The home cost approximately $320,000 - $360,000 to build/ 
32. The home has been appraised at $455,000. (See R-19). 
33. The first mortgage is approximately $328,765. 
34. The home equity loan balance is approximately $44,990. 
35. The lot cost $46,000 (See P-8). The petitioner paid for the lot as follows: 
a) $16,000 - personal check of petitioner, dated 1/8/99. (See P-20). 
b) $30.000 - line of credit on Roy Home. 
c) $46,000 -(total amount of a and b, above). 
36. The petitioner claims the lot payment is a premarital asset. 
37. The respondent claims the $16,000 payment is not a premarital asset. 
38. The court finds that petitioner is entitled to the $46,000 as a pre-marital asset. 
Page 4 of 12 
39. Both parties are asking that the West Haven home be awarded to them. This is 
impossible to do. 
40. The Court orders the West Haven home awarded to the respondent. 
41. Respondent is responsible to pay the 1st mortgage and home equity loan. 
42. Petitioner has a lien on the West Haven home for $46,000, representing his lot 
payment. (Premarital asset.) 
Dissipation: 
43. The petitioner claims the respondent diverted $46,460.86 from the construction loan 
and placed the money in her personal account at Zion's Bank. (See P-l 1). 
44. The petitioner claims the respondent forged his signature on several checks from the 
construction loan. 
45. The petitioner claims he never knew about this until after the home was completed. 
46. The respondent claims she did not hide assets or forge the petitioners signature on 
checks. 
47. The respondent claims the petitioner was aware of the construction costs and the 
petitioner authorized respondent to pay for construction costs. 
48. Respondent claims petitioner authorized the signing of checks on the construction 
loan. 
49. While marital assets are generally valued as of the date of the divorce, where one 
party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, the Court may in the exercise of equitable power, 
value assets at some time other than the decree. See Parker v. Parker, P2d 565 (Utah App 2000). 
50. The Court finds there is insufficient evidence to prove the respondent hid income or 
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diverted assets. 
51. The Court will deny petitioner's claim for dissipation. 
Alimony: 
52. The purpose of alimony is to enable respondent to maintain, as nearly as possible, the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the other party from becoming a 
public charge. 
53. Alimony is not automatically awarded whenever there is a disparity between the 
parties' income. See Burt v. Burt 779 P2d 1166 (Utah 1990). 
54. Consideration must be made of the needs and abilities of both parties before an award 
of alimony is made. 
55. Alimony findings should consider several factors: 
a) the financial condition and need of the party seeking alimony; 
b) the seeking party's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself, and, 
c) the ability of the other party to provide support. 
56. The parties were married on April 25,1998 (marriage length is seven years). 
57. The parties separated three times, the last being June of 2003. 
58. The respondent was to receive temporary alimony in the sum of $1,500, starting 
November 1, 2002. However, the petitioner made the mortgage payment of $2,600 per month in 
lieu of alimony. 
59. Respondent is over 40 years old. 
60. The respondent; is employed and currently earns $4,000 a month in net income. (See 
R-2 and R-3). 
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61. The respondent earned the following annual income: 
1999 $64,000 
2000 $52,000 
2001 $35,000 
2002 $66,000 
2003 $108,000 
2004 $132,000 
(See P4, P28, and P32) 
62. Respondent's monthly expenses are listed at $7,125. (See R-3). 
63. Petitioner is 47 years old. Petitioner is employed and currently earns about $10,000 
month. (SeeR-17,page2). 
64. The petitioner earned the following annual income: 
2000 $75,000 
2001 $81,000 
2002 $154,000 
2003 $80,000 
2004 $72,000 
65. Petitioner's monthly expenses are listed at $7,311.53 (P-41). 
66. Respondent is asking for $3,585 per month in alimony. 
67. Petitioner believes the respondent should receive no alimony. 
68. The Court finds the petitioner has the ability to provide support to the respondent. 
69. The Court also finds the respondent has the ability to earn income for herself 
70. The Court will deny alimony to the respondent for the following reasons: 
a) respondent has the ability to earn income. 
b) the marriage between petitioner and respondent was not lengthy - seven years. 
c) the parties are both of middle age and capable of earning income. 
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d) there are no children from this marriage. 
Debts: 
71. Any debts incurred prior to marriage remain the responsibility of that party. 
72. Any debts incurred after separation are the responsibility of the party who took out 
the debt or loan. 
73. Any debts incurred during the marriage will be divided equally, regardless of who 
took out the debt or loan. 
74. The Court finds that the petitioner knew about the debts that were incurred during the 
marriage. 
75. Although the parties separated three times during the marriage, they reconciled each 
time, with the exception of the last separation. 
76. The Court finds that the petitioner forgave the respondent for any debts incurred 
during the first and second separation, and thus those debts became marital debts to be divided 
equally. 
77. However, the respondent is solely responsible for paying off the $52,000 loan from 
her parents (Carl Manzel). 
78. Respondent is solely responsible for the $26,000 loan from Todd Walker. 
Division of Personal Property: 
79. Each party is presumed entitled to all of his or her separate property (premarital 
property) and fifty per cent of marital property. (See Dunn v. Dunn 822 P2d 1314 (Utah 1990). 
80. An unequal division of marital property is only justified when the Court finds 
exceptional circumstances supporting distribution. (See Bradford v. Bradford 993 P2d 887 (Utah 
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1999). 
81. The Court finds that each party is entitled to keep all personal property which was 
acquired prior to the marriage. 
82. The Court finds that all personal property acquired during the marriage will be 
divided equally. 
83. The Court finds no exceptional circumstances for an unequal division of personal 
marital property. 
84. Lynn Livingston appraised some of the personal property. (See R-20 and R-16). 
85. The Court finds the appraisal is fair and reasonable and will be used to assess the 
value of personal property. 
86. All items marked as premarital assets are awarded to the party who owned the 
property prior to the marriage. 
87. All property owned or purchased during the marriage will be divided equally. 
88. Each party can prepare two lists of items sought (wish list). 
89. The other party will pick the list they wish to follow. 
90. Items in petitioner's or respondent's possession which have not been appraised will 
be divided equally. 
Retirement Accounts: 
91. Both parties have retirement accounts (see P-l 1). 
92. The Court orders the retirement accounts divided according to the Woodward 
Formula. 
93. The division of the retirement accounts should only be for the duration of marriage. 
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94. Retirement funds accumulated during the marriage are marital assets and are 
appropriate for division. 
95. The retirement accounts will be valued as of the date of the divorce decree. 
96. The retirement accounts will be divided equally for the period of time the parties were 
married. See Dunn v. Dunn 802 P2d 1314 (Utah 1990). (SeeP-7, P-16 and R-17). 
97. Each party is entitled to receive $957.35 from the retirement accounts. 
Vehicles: 
98. The Kia is awarded to Ashley Stonehocker. 
99. The Volkswagen Passat is awarded to the respondent. 
Contempt: 
100. Respondent is asking the Court to hold the petitioner in contempt for violating 
several court orders. (R-l 1). 
a) the petitioner was ordered not to sell the Roy home (P-14, Page 28), and did so. 
b) petitioner was ordered not to contact respondent, pursuant to a protective 
order and restraining order, and did so. 
c) petitioner was ordered not to drive within 500 feet of respondent's home, 
and did so. 
101. The petitioner was held in contempt of court by Commissioner Thomas on July 19, 
2004 and ordered to serve five days in jail for violating the court orders. 
102. The Commissioner allowed petitioner to purge the contempt, based on his conduct 
after that date. 
103. The Court finds that petitioner has not violated the court order since July 19,2004. 
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104. The court will not find petitioner in contempt at this time. 
Attorney Fees: 
105. Petitioner claims he has incurred attorney fees and costs of $33,279.27. (P-40). 
106. Petitioner is asking the Court to award attorney fees and costs. 
107. Respondent claims attorney fees and costs of $35,979.00. 
108. Respondent is asking the Court to award attorney fees and costs. 
109. The petitioner told the Court during the trial that the respondent was not entitled to 
anything. Petitioner said he wanted everything. 
110. The Court finds the petitioner's position to be unreasonable, untenable and totally 
unrealistic. 
111. The Court will, therefore, order the petitioner to pay $25,000 to the respondent's 
attorney for attorney fees, court costs, and accountant's fees. (R-12) 
112. Petitioner is also responsible for his own attorney fees and costs. 
113. Petitioner will prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree of divorce 
consistent with this decision. 
Dated this 5 of ( ( H V, 2005. 
ERNIE JONES 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CElOH'J DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICKL.STONEHOCKER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No.: 024902009 
Judge: Ernie W. Jones 
Commissioner: Douglas Thomas 
The above entitled matter was tried before the Honorable Ernie W. Jones on the 
4, 7, and 8 day of April, the 19,20, and 27 day of May and on the 14 and 17 day of June 
2005. The Petitioner was present and represented by his attorney Philip Patterson and the 
Respondent was present and represented by her attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court took 
testimony and evidence from the parities and thereafter took the matter under advisement. 
The court issued a Memorandum Decision on the 5th day of July 2005 and thereafter, held a 
hearing on September 21,2005, on the parties Motions to modify the court's ruling. Now 
therefore, the court makes the following; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
VD18801010 
024802009 STONEHOCKER, JACQUELINE FM 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The parties were residents of Weber County for more than three months before 
immediately prior to the commencement of this divorce proceeding. 
The parties were married on April 25,1998. 
The parties separated and reconciled several times; in April 2001, October 2002, and 
June 20Qg.^&M-
The divorce petition was filed September 23,2002. 
No children have been born as issue of the marriage, and none are expected. 
There are irreconcilable differences which make it unreasonable for them to remain 
married. The parties should be granted a Decree of Divorce from each other to 
become final upon signing by the Judge and entry with the Clerk of the Court. 
The Petitioner owns a used car dealership called "Stoney Motors." 
The Petitioner created the dealership in 2001. 
The Respondent claims an interest in the dealership as a marital asset 
The Respondent is listed on the LLC. as a 50% owner of Stoney Motors. 
The Respondent is not involved in the day-to-day operation of the business. 
The Respondent did do some billing, and paperwork with the dealership several 
years ago. 
The Petitioner claims the dealership has no value for good will, and therefore, the 
Respondent is not entitled to any monetary compensation from the dealership. 
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14. The dealership has been valued by accountant Chuck Ulrich at about $200,000.00. 
15. Accountant, Altina Stott told Chuck Ulrich that she valued the business at about 
$100,000.00. 
16. The Respondent asked for one-half of the value of the business as a marital asset. 
17. If the Petitioner retired at the time of the divorce and his dealership was actually 
sold, and an amount was realized over and above the value of the tangible assets, the 
full amount should be viewed as marital property. 
18. In this case, the Petitioner has not retired and no actual sale took place. The 
Petitioner continues his business as of the day of trial. 
19. It would not be equitable to require the Petitioner to pay the Respondent part of the 
value ascribed to the good will, because the good will of a car dealer is nothing more 
than his reputation for competency. 
20. Professional reputations can be valued, but unless the professional retires and his 
business is sold, his reputation should not be treated differently from a professional 
or an advanced degree, both simply enhance and earning ability of the holder. 
21. Although the Respondent is listed as a co-owner of said business, the Respondent 
had only token involvement in the business for a limited period of time. 
22. Also, while it was true that the Respondent received a K-1 tax form which showed 
that the Respondent received ordinary income from the business, the Respondent 
testified that she never actually received any income from the business. 
23. The court finds that the business is in reality a sole proprietorship for the Petitioner, 
Rick Stonehocker. 
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24. The court finds that the Respondent is not entitled to receive any portion of Stoney 
Motors as a marital asset. The court finds that the good will of Stoney Motors is 
solely attributable to the Petitioner's personal, professional reputation. The 
Respondent is not awarded anything for the good will of Stoney Motors. 
25. During the course of the marriage a line of credit was acquired on November 27, 
2000, against the home in West Haven, Utah in the amount of $45,000.00. This 
money was transferred into the Stoney Motors business account during May 2001. 
This indebtedness is a debt of Stoney Motors. 
26. The court finds, however, that the Petitioner is responsible to pay all State and 
Federal taxes that were sent to the Respondent on the K-l forms for the years 2002, 
2003, and 2004 in connection with Stoney Motors. 
27. The Respondent is held harmless for the Federal and State income taxes incurred for 
Stoney Motors. This debt is in the nature of family support and therefore, is not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
28. The Petitioner's home in Roy, Utah is premarital and is awarded to the Petitioner as 
his sole property. 
29. The Petitioner owned a condominium in Riverdale, Utah which property was a 
premarital asset of the Petitioner and is awarded to the Petitioner. 
30. The parties purchased a time share in Cabo San Lucas and the court awards said time 
share to the Petitioner. 
31. The parties built a home in West Haven, Utah during 26frl. 
32. The home cost approximately $320,000.00 to $360,000.00 to build. 
33. The home has been appraised at $455,000.00. 
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34. The first mortgage balance is approximately $328,765.00 which is in the name of the 
Petitioner. 
35. The home has a equity line balance is approximately $44,990.00 which is in the 
name of the Petitioner. 
36. The lot costs $46,000.00. The Petitioner paid for said lot as follows: 
a. $16,000.00 - personal check of Petitioner, dated 1/8/99. 
b. $30.000.00 - line of credit on the Roy Home. 
c. $46,000.00 - (total amount of a and b, above). 
37. The Petitioner claims that lot payment is a premarital asset. 
38. The Respondent claims the $ 16,000.00 payment is not a premarital asset. 
39. The court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to the $46,000.00 as a premarital asset. 
40. Both parties are asking that the West Haven home be awarded to them. This is 
impossible to do. 
41. The Court orders the West Haven home awarded to the Respondent. 
42. The Respondent is responsible to pay the 1st mortgage and the line of credit. The 
line of credit which is secured by the home in the approximate sum of $44,990.00 as 
indicated in paragraph 25 herein, is a debt of Stoney Motors which has been awarded 
to the Petitioner. The Respondent shall assume and pay this line of credit which 
shall be a full satisfaction for the Petitioner's premarital investment in the home of 
approximately $46,000.00. 
43. The Petitioner claims the Respondent diverted $46,460.86 from the construction 
loan and placed the money in her personal account at Zion's Bank. 
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44. The Petitioner claims the Respondent forged his signature on several checks from 
the construction loan. 
45. The Petitioner claims he never knew about this until after the home was completed. 
46. The Respondent claims she did not hide assets or forge the Petitioners signature on 
checks. 
47. The Respondent claims the Petitioner was aware of the construction costs and the 
Petitioner authorized Respondent to pay for construction costs. 
48. Respondent claims Petitioner authorized the signing of checks on the construction 
loan. 
49. While marital assets are generally valued as of the date of the divorce, where one 
party has dissipated an asset, or hidden its value, the Court may in the exercise of 
equitable power, value assets at some time other than the decree. 
50. The court finds there is insufficient evidence to prove the Respondent hid income or 
diverted assets. 
51. The court will deny the Petitioner's claim for dissipation. 
52. The purpose of alimony is to enable the Respondent to maintain, as nearly as 
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the other 
party from becoming a public charge. 
53. Alimony is not automatically awarded whenever there is a disparity between the 
parties income. 
54. Consideration must be made of the needs and abilities of both parties before an 
award of alimony is made. 
55. Alimony findings should consider several factors: 
a. the financial condition and need of the party seeking alimony; 
b. the seeking party's ability to produce a sufficient income for herself, and, 
c. the ability of the other party to provide support. 
56. The parties were married on April 25,1998 (marriage length is seven years). 
57. The parties separated three times, the last being July 31 st, 2003. 
58. The Respondent was to receive temporary alimony in the sum of $1,500.00, starting 
November 1,2002. However, the Petitioner made the mortgage payment of 
$2,600.00 per month in lieu of alimony. 
59. The Respondent is under 40 years old. 
60. The Respondent is employed and currently earns $4,000.00 a month in net income. 
61. The Respondent earns the following annual income: 
1999 $64,000.00 
2000 $52,000.00 
2001 $35,000.00 
2002 $66,000.00 
2003 $108,000.00 
2004 $132,000.00 
62. The Respondent's monthly expenses are listed at $7,125.00. 
63. The Petitioner is 47 years old. The Petitioner is employed and currently earns about 
$10,000.00 per month. 
64. The Petitioner earns the following annual income: 
2000 $75,000.00 
2001 $81,000.00 
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J 
2002 $154,000.00 
2003 $80,000.00 
2004 $72,000.00 
65. The Petitioner's monthly expenses are listed at $7,311.53 
66. The Respondent is asking for $3,585.00 per month in alimony. 
67. The Petitioner believes the Respondent should receive no alimony. 
68. The court finds the Petitioner has the ability to provide support to the Respondent. 
69. The court also finds the Respondent has the ability to earn income for herself. 
70. The court will deny alimony to the Respondent for the following reasons: 
a. respondent has the ability to earn income. 
b. the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was not lengthy - seven years. 
c. the parties are both of middle age and capable of earning income. 
d. there are no children from this marriage. 
7!. Any debts incurred prior to marriage remains the responsibility of that party. 
72. Any debts incurred after separation which was July 31,2003, are the responsibility 
of the parties who took out the debt or loan. 
73. Any debts incurred during the marriage and before separation will be divided 
equally, regardless of who took out the debt or loan. 
74. The court finds that the Petitioner knew about the debts that were incurred during 
the marriage. 
75. Although the parties separated three times during the marriage, they reconciled each 
time, with the exception of the last separation. 
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76. The court finds that the Petitioner forgave the Respondent for any debts incurred 
during the first and second separation, and thus those debts become marital debts to 
be divided equally. 
77. However, the Respondent is solely responsible for paying off the $52,000.00 loan 
from her father Carl Manzel. 
78. Respondent is solely responsible for the $26,000.00 loan from Todd Walker. 
79. Each party is presumed entitled to all of his or her separate property (premarital 
property) and fifty percent of marital property. 
80. An unequal division of marital personal property is only justified when the Court 
finds exceptional circumstances support distribution. 
81. The court finds that each party is entitled to keep all personal property which was 
acquired prior to the marriage. 
82. The court finds that all personal property acquired during the marriage will be 
divided equally. 
8?. The court finds no exceptional circumstances for an unequal division of personal 
marital property. 
84. Lynn Lingingston appraised some of the personal property. 
85. The court finds the appraisal is fair and reasonable and will use the appraisal to 
value the personal property. 
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$6. All items marked as premarital assets are awarded to the party who owned the 
property prior to the marriage. 
87. All property owned or purchased during the marriage will be divided equally. 
SB. Aparty shall prepare two lists of the personal property. 
89. The other party will pick the list they wish to follow. 
90. Items in Petitioner's or Respondent possession which have not been appraised will 
be divided equally. 
91. Both parties have retirement accounts. 
92. The court orders the retirement accounts divided according to the Woodward 
Formula. 
93. The division of the retirements accounts should only be for the duration of 
marriage. 
94. Retirement funds accumulated during the marriage are marital assets and are 
appropriate for division. 
95. The retirement accounts will be valued as of the date of the Divorce Decree. 
96. The retirement accounts will be divided equally for the period of time the parties 
were married. 
97. Each party is entitled to receive $957.35 from the retirement accounts. 
98. The Respondent's daughter, Ashley Manzel shall be awarded the Kia. 
99. The Respondent is awarded the Volkswagen Passot. 
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100. The Respondent is asking the court to hold the Petitioner in contempt for violating 
several court orders. 
a. the Petitioner was ordered to not to sell the Roy home and did so. 
b. petitioner was order not to contact respondent, pursuant to a No Contact Order 
and restraining order, and did so. 
c. petitioner was ordered not to drive within 500 feet of respondent's home, and 
did so. 
101. The Petitioner was held in contempt of court by Commissioner Thomas on July 19, 
2004 and ordered to serve five days in jail for violating the court orders. 
102. The Commissioner allowed the Petitioner to purge the contempt, based on his 
conduct after that date. 
103. The court finds that Petitioner has not violated the court order since July 19,2004. 
104. The court will not find Petitioner in contempt at this time. 
105. Petitioner claims he has incurred attorney's fees and costs of $33,279.27. 
106. Petitioner is asking the Court to award attorney fees and costs. 
107. Respondent claims attorney fees and costs of $35,979.00. 
108. Respondent is asking the Court to award attorney fees and costs. 
109. The Petitioner told the court during the trial that the Respondent was not entitled to 
anything. The Petitioner said he wanted everything. 
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110. The court finds that the Petitioner's position to be unreasonable, untenable, and 
totally unrealistic. 
111. The court will, therefore, order the Petitioner to pay $25,000.00 to the Respondent's 
attorney for attorney fees, court costs, and accountant's fees. This debt is in the 
nature of family support and therefore, is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
112. The Petitioner is responsible for his own attorney fees and costs. 
113. The Respondent shall be restored to her maiden name of, Jaqueline Forest Manzel. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from each other, which divorce 
should become final and absolute upon signing by the Judge and filing with the 
Weber County Clerk's Office. 
2. The terms, provisions, and conditions contained in the parties Findings of Fact should 
be included as part of the court's Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this J2_£day of December 2005. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
STEVEN R. BAEEY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
SUITE 200 
OCDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801)393-2300 
FAX: (801)393-2340 
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
Attorney for Respondent 
2491 Washington Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-393-2300 
Facsimile: 801-393-2340 
200b JAN - 3 P J: U5 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
01-03-Qs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH-
RICK L. STONEHOCKER 
Petitioner, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
JAQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER 
Respondent. 
Case No.: 024902009 
Judge: Emie W, Jones 
Commissioner: Douglas Thomas 
The above entitled matter was tried before the Honorable Ernie W, Jones on the 
4,7, and 8 day of April, the 19,20, and 27 day of May and on the 14 and 17 day of June 
2005. The Petitioner was present and represented by his attorney Philip Patterson and the 
Respondent was present and represented by her attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court took 
testimony and evidence from the parities and thereafter took the matter under advisement. 
The court issued a Memorandum Decision on the 5th day of July 2005 and thereafter, held a 
hearing on September 21,2005, on the parties' Motions to modify the court's ruling. Now 
therefore, 
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ROBERTA. ECHARD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
SUITE 200 
OCDEN, UTAH 84401 
(SOI) 393-2300 
FAX: (801)393-2340 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The parties are granted a Decree of Divorce from each other to become final upon 
signing by the Judge and entry with the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The Petitioner is awarded the sole proprietorship of the business known as Stoney 
Motors and shall be solely responsible for all indebtedness associated with said 
business including; all State and Federal taxes incurred for Stoney Motors and all the 
State and Federal taxes from the income that was reported to the Respondent on K-i's 
for the year 2002,2003, and 2004. This debt is in the nature of family support and 
therefore is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, +
 f „ . 
3. The Petitioner's home in Roy, Utah is premarital and is awarded to theJVscpcmdgnt as 
his sole property. 
4. The Petitioner owned a condominium in Riverdale, Utah which property was a 
premarital asset of the Petitioner and is awarded to the Petitioner. 
5. The parties purchased a time share in Cabo San Lucas and the court awards said time 
share to the Petitioner. 
6. The Respondent is awarded the home in West Haven, Utah which is described more 
specifically as; ail of Lot 43, Rocky Mountain Meadows Phase 3 subdivision, West 
Haven City, Weber County, Utah. The Respondent shall assume and pay the first 
mortgage, and the line of credit which are secured by the real property. The 
Respondent shall refinance the first mortgage and the line of credit on the home 
within 90 days after the Decree of Divorce is final. 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
SUITE 200 
OCDCN. UTAH 84401 
(801) 393-2300 
FAX: (801)393-2340 
7. The line of credit which is secured by the home in the approximate sum of 
$44,990.00 is a debt of Stoney Motors which has been awarded to the Petitioner. The 
Respondent shall assume and pay this line of credit which shall be a full satisfaction 
for the Petitioner's premarital investment in the home of approximately $46,000.00. 
8. Each party shall pay any debts they incurred prior to the marriage. 
9. Each party shall pay any debts they incurred after separation in July 31,2003. 
10. Any debts incurred during the marriage shall be divided equally, regardless of who 
took out the debt or loan. 
11. The Respondent is solely responsible for paying the $52,000.00 loan to her father 
Carl Manzel 
12. The Respondent shall pay the debt to Todd Walker. 
13. Each party is entitled to all of his or her premarital property, and fifty percent of 
marital property. 
14. The marital properties acquired by the parties except as otherwise specifically set 
forth herein, shall be equally divided between the parties. The appraisal of the 
personal property conducted by Lynn Livingston shall be used in determining the 
value the personal property. Any personal property in either parties possession not 
appraised shall be divided equally. 
15. A party shall prepare two lists of the personal property and the other party shall pick 
the list they wish to have. 
<! 
ROBERTA. ECHARD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2491 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
SUITE 200 
OCDEN, UTAH 84401 
(801)393-2300 
FAX: (801) 393-2340 
16. Both parties have retirement accounts, and those accounts shall be divided according 
to the Woodward Formula for the retirements accumulated during the course of the 
marriage. The retirement accounts will be valued as of the date of the Divorce 
Decree is signed. 
17. Each party shall receive the sum of $957.35 from the retirement accounts. 
18. The Respondent's daughter, Ashley Manzel is awarded the Kia. 
19. The Respondent is awarded the Volkswagen Passat. 
20. The Respondent is restored to her maiden name of Jaqueline Foiest Manzel. 
21. The Respondent's request that the Petitioner be held in contempt of court is denied. 
22. The Petitioner is responsible for paying his own attorney's fees and court costs. 
23. The Respondent is awarded a judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of 
$25,000.00 for the Respondent's attorney's fees, court costs, and accountant's fees. 
This debt is in the nature of family support and is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
DATED this? ffday of December 2005. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ROBERT ECHARD 
& ASSOCIATES 
LAW OFFICES 
KEY BANK BUILDING, SUITX 200 
24*1 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
OGDZK UTAH 84401 
(801)393-2300 
FAX (801)393-2340 
OCT 3 Wisffl'M ROBERTA. ECHARD, 953 ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Respondent 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: 801-393-2300 
Facsimile: 801-393-2340 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICK L. STONEHOCKER 
Petitioner, 
OC-TO^03 
VS. 
JAQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Case No.: 024902009 
Judge: Ernie W. Jones 
Commissioner: Douglas Thomas 
The above entitled matter came on for a hearing on the Respondent's Order to Show 
Cause before Commissioner Thomas on the 10th day of September 2003, at 3:00 p.m. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by his attorney, Philip Patterson, and the Respondent 
was present and represented by her attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court having received 
documents, Affidavits and having heard proffers of evidence, and being fully informed in the 
premises, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The court awards the Respondent the temporary possession of home. This decision is 
based primarily on the requirement of this location. The Respondent currently resides 
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in the home with her son who is approximately 12 or 13 years of age and her daughter 
Ashley, who is 17 years of age and pregnant. The Petitioner is currently residing in a 
condominium, 
2. The Court has reviewed the information concerning the parties income. For the 
purposes of determining temporary family support or financial adjustments, the Court 
concludes that the Petitioner has an income of $5,625.00 after deductions of 25% 
percent taxes. The parties have a first mortgage on the home in the approximate sum 
of $2,656.89 per month, and a second mortgage on the home in the approximate sum 
of $180.00. The second mortgage sum fluctuates, but the Petitioner represented that 
it is an average of the monthly costs for the second mortgage. On a temporary basis, 
the Petitioner shall pay the first and second mortgages and shall keep those sums 
current. 
3. The Respondent shall pay the utilities on the home and shall leave the utilities in the 
Petitioner's name with the exception of the Direct TV and the phone, which shall be 
changed into the Respondent's name. 
4. The Petitioner shall make arrangements to have his mail forwarded to his new 
address, so that he will have not have to go to the home. The Petitioner shall be 
responsible for providing on a prompt basis, the bills for the utilities which are in his 
name. 
5. The parties are mutually restrained from contacting each other. Any modification of 
this no contact order must be in a written stipulation and submitted to the court for 
signature. The Petitioner is restrained from entering or accessing the premises now 
occupied by the Respondent and her children, 
6. The Petitioner shall prepare through his attorney, a list of any personal property that 
he wants from the home and submit the list to the Respondent's attorney. The 
Respondent's attorney shall respond to that list and the personal property agreed upon 
shall be delivered to the Petitioner at the home, at a time to be agreed upon by the 
attorney's. At that specific time, the Petitioner can collect those items from the home 
will are to be placed outside of the home by the Respondent 
7. Both parties are mutually restrained from disposing o£ encumbering, or damaging 
any of their assets during the pendency of this action. 
8. The parties have attempted mediation in the past, and therefore, are not required to 
engage in further mediation prior to a Pre-Triall hearing being held in this matter. 
9. Both parties shall complete their discovery within 120 days. 
10. The records of the business being operated by the Petitioner shall be delivered the 
accountant, Roger Nuttall and the Respondent's attorney shall have access to the 
reports in the possession of Roger Nuttall and shall be permitted to communicate with 
Roger Nuttall concerning the information that he has accumulate. 
11. The Respondent currently possess and uses a 1998 Volkswagen Passat automobile. 
She shall be entitled to obtain the temporary possession of said vehicle and the 
Petitioner shall be entitled to retain the temporary possession of any vehicle that he 
uses. 
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LAW OFFICES 
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FAX (801) 393-2340 
12. The issues of attorney's fees and all other issues raised by the Order to Show Cause 
not dealt with herein are reserved, 
DATED this A day o J2003. 
OMMENDEDBY: 
Lai 
COUCT COMMISSIONER 
'jfaM 
-DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER AND COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for the Respondent will submit 
the foregoing for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice was 
mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to 
that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administrative of 1988. 
Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this^4??day of September 2003. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING & FAX 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s): 
Philip Patterson 
42727*80-661 
Ogden,UT 84401 
DATED th i s j ^ . day of September 2003. 
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MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
1004 24th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801)621-3662 
Facsimile: (801)392-2543 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICK L. STONEHOCKER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAQUELINE F.M. STONEHOCKER, 
Respondent. 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER 
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
10 % 5 ZOO* 
Civil No. 024902009 
Judge: Ernie W. Jones 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on petitioner's Order 
To Show Cause before the Honorable Douglas Thomas, Domestic Relations 
Commissioner of the above-entitled court, on April 29, 2004. Petitioner was personally 
present and represented by his attorney, Martin W. Custen. Respondent was personally 
present and represented by her attorney, Robert A. Echard. The court, being now fully 
advised in the premises, and having considered ail Affidavits and other submissions, and 
having heard argument of counsel, now makes and enters the following: 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED AND ORDERED as follows: 
1. The following items of personal property are to be picked up by 
petitioner, through the use of a moving company, at the marital residence, currently 
occupied by respondent, at a time and date to be agreed upon mutually by the parties 
through COUnsel:
 Rec0mmendation and Order on Order to Show Cause 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker 
5 Civil No. 024902009 
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« A. Petitioner's daughter Rachel's property as follows: her bedroom 
? 
S furniture; a television set; an entertainment set; a curio cabinet; a porcelain doll collection; 
her clothing; her pictures and personal items; a VCR; any other property of Rachel's that 
is in respondent's possession. 
B. Petitioner's tools, other than a basic set of tools that respondent 
needs for basic household repair; the old patio set; the television set from respondent's son 
Carter's room; the remainder of petitioner's golf equipment; the armoire that petitioner used 
as a t.v. cabinet; the credenza and desk; the remainder of the Uniden satellite equipment. 
C. Petitioner is entitled to be in telephone contact with the 
professional movers, but shall not ask them in any manner to communicate with 
respondent. 
2. Some amount should be imputed to respondent for rent from Ms. 
Nessen, who has been living there with Ms. Nessen's child since March 1, 2004, and 
whatever that amount is should be retroactive to that date. However, the court cannot 
determine at this time the amount, and therefore the specific amount is reserved as a trial 
issue. 
3. Also reserved as a trial issue is the issue of the parties' responsibility 
for unpaid utilities that had accrued at the marital residence up to the time of the first show 
cause hearing held on September 10,2003. 
4. Respondent is to reinstate the family health insurance plan through 
her employment with SkyWest Airlines as of May 1, 2004, including medical and dental 
insurance. Respondent is to include petitioner in this coverage and petitioner is to pay 
one-third of respondent's out-of-pocket cost for the full family premium, and to make his 
monthly payment by the 5th day of May, 2004, and then by the 5th day of each preceding 
w 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker 
Civil No. 024902009 
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month. 
5. The issue of responsibility for attorney fees in connection with this 
hearing, in terms of both parties, is reserved for trial. 
DATED this -2 * / day of - ^ ^ , 2004. 
BY RECOMMENDATION: 
)UGLAS THOMAS 
Court Commissioner 
<*~A* 
BY THE COURT 
ERNIE W. JONES 
District Judge 
<fc-~i— 
Approved As To Form and Content 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Rules of Civil Procedure 
Q Rules of Civil Procedure 
Q PART VI. TRIALS 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions 
the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided 
in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact 
are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be 
raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the 
district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion 
to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in 
actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may 
be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1987.) 
Copyright © 2006 Loislaw.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time 
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any 
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule 
entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time 
provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the 
petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a 
parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the 
immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing 
party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the 
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or 
exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase 
in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor 
spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant 
facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on 
the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of 
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning 
capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court 
may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify 
that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the 
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to 
share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court 
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of 
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment 
of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically 
terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if 
the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of 
alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Copyright © 2006 Loislaw.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
D TITLE 30 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Q CHAPTER 3 DIVORCE 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary 
alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any 
action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order 
a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including 
expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs 
of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court 
may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its 
discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the 
court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason 
for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a 
party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the 
separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any children 
in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final 
order or judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in 
the final order or judgment. 
Copyright © 2006 Loislaw.com, Inc. All Rights Reserved 
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Utah Statutes 
Q Utah Statutes 
D TITLE 30 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Cl CHAPTER 3 DIVORCE 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties 
and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious 
petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, 
and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an 
order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care 
expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines 
that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the 
noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to 
children born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce 
may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights 
of grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall 
